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Fundraising and optimal policy rules
Murat Munganyand Bar¬¸s K. Yörükz
Abstract
This paper develops a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target
population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any
intervention, the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities
may be sub-optimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings
and show that a regulatory mechanism can be designed to achieve socially desirable outcomes.
In contrast to the previous literature, our model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the
optimal market structure. We show that if xed costs associated with establishing charities are
su¢ ciently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly. Given the importance of
the trade-o¤ between the volume and variety of charitable services, we argue that this result may
be of particular interest to policy makers.
Keywords: fundraising, social planner, regulatory policy
JEL classication: H21, L31, L38
1 Introduction
Each year, people contribute billions of dollars to a wide range of charitable organizations. Estimates
are that in 2006 over $200 billion was given by individuals to charitable causes. Individual giving
has also been increasing over time. On average, people gave approximately 1:5% of their income
to charities in 1995, whereas this amount has risen to 2:1% in 2001.1 As individual giving has
increased over time, fundraising has evolved into a highly professional industry, resulting in thousands
We thank Hideo Konishi, Larry Kranich, Tayfun Sönmez, and Richard Tresch for their helpful discussions and
comments. All errors remain ours.
yBoston College, Department of Economics and George Mason University, Law School. E-mail: mungan@bc.edu.
zUniversity at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. E-mail: byoruk@albany.edu.
1Source: Giving USA, 2003. See, Andreoni (2006a) for further discussion and detailed gures.
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of charitable organizations hiring professional fundraising sta¤ and spending considerable amounts of
money in fundraising activities each year.
These facts raise several important policy questions. First, what role do fundraisers play in
a¤ecting the amount of charitable gifts received? Although the existing literature does not focus
much on the e¤ect of fundraising on charitable giving, recent empirical research has shown that
fundraising plays a vital role in increasing both the propensity to give and the level of contributions.
For example, using data drawn from tax returns of charitable organizations, Khanna et al. (1995) and
Okten and Weisbrod (2000) show that there is a positive relationship between fundraising expenses
and total charitable contributions. A similar relationship is also found by Schervish and Havens
(1997) and Yörük (2009) using household level survey data.
Given the importance of fundraising, another relevant question is how much money should chari-
ties allocate on fundraising expenses? Recently, many charities have been criticized for spending too
much of their resources on fundraising. The focus on fundraising costs has become so intense that
many charity evaluators and potential donors tend to view the level of such costs as the principal
characteristic to take into account in estimating the quality of charitable organizations. The evidence
suggests that the concerns on excessive fundraising expenses are legitimate. Recent IRS data on
charitable organizations show that on average charities spend around 18% of total contributions in
fundraising expenses whereas the widely accepted standard among professional fundraisers is 10%.2
Furthermore, estimates from the empirical studies show that many charitable organizations spend
too much money on fundraising expenses. For example, Jacobs and Marudas (2006) investigate 76
non-prot organizations and nd that among them 24 engaged in excessive fundraising. Okten and
Weisbrod (2000) report that the ratio between fundraising expenditures and private donations aver-
ages 15% for di¤erent types of charitable organizations. It is also well-documented in the theoretical
literature that competition among charities may result in excessive fundraising costs.3
In light of these ndings, what regulatory policies can a policy maker use to eliminate excessive
fundraising expenses? A widely discussed policy in the literature is to impose a monopoly united
charity and regulate entry into the market.4 This policy helps to economize on fundraising costs
by reducing competition for donations among member charities. Although this policy seems to be
e¤ective, it also has an obvious shortcoming. It sacrices diversity among charities. However, pro-
moting a variety of charitable services may be desirable since specialization in a competitive charity
2See, for example, Bradley, Jansen, and Silverman (2003).
3See, for example, Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Economides and Rose-Ackerman (1993).
4Rose-Ackerman (1982) discusses the pros and cons of the united monopoly charities.
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market encourages people to contribute to charities that provide their favorite charitable services.5
Therefore, while maximizing overall contributions, an ideal policy should also allow for ideological
diversity among charities.6
Since Rose-Ackerman (1982) has introduced the rst formal theoretical model of fundraising,
several others have attempted to model charitable organizations as strategic players. Most of the
theoretical literature has focused on the e¤ect of various fundraising techniques on the amount of
contributions received,7 while only a handful of studies have examined undesirable e¤ects of compe-
tition among charities and relevant policy solutions. The main conclusion of the papers that focus on
competitive charity markets is that diversication of charities does not produce optimal results even
when people have widely varying tastes for charitable services. This paper builds on this result. We
develop a simple spatial model of fundraising in which charities with di¤erent ideologies select a target
population to solicit donations. We refer to this interaction among charities as the solicitation game.
In contrast to the previous studies, we assume that charitable solicitations are noisy signals that
inform the potential donor about the ideology of the charity.8 Using these signals, donors contribute
to the charity that they believe is the closest to their ideology. We analyze the equilibrium properties
of the solicitation game and show that competition among charities may not produce socially optimal
results in a market without any intervention.9 In particular, competition may yield a sub-optimal
level of overall contributions relative to the cost of fundraising. If the cost of fundraising is su¢ ciently
low, then some donors are solicited by multiple charities which leads to excessive fundraising costs.
In contrast, if the fundraising costs are su¢ ciently high, then a sub-optimal number of charities may
enter the market. Furthermore, we recognize the trade-o¤ between the variety and volume of chari-
table services as an important policy problem. We show that the optimal market structure depends
only on the natural costs of fundraising such as the xed costs of establishing a charity and soliciting
donations. If these costs are su¢ ciently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly.
5A monopoly united charity may not be desirable for charities as well, since they may also dislike the monitoring of
their activities (Chua and Wong, 2003).
6Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) propose that a pre-commitment by the monopoly charity to an allocation rule which
honors donorscontributions to specic causes can solve this policy dilemma.
7Recent theoretical models of several fundraising techniques include publicizing donor names and contribution
amounts (Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Harbough, 1998; Romano and Yildirim, 2001), ra­ es (Duncan, 2002), using
seed money and refunds (Andreoni, 1998), and leadership giving (Andreoni, 2006b and Vesterlund, 2003).
8 In this context, Rose-Ackerman (1982) uses the word ideology, Economides and Rose-Ackerman use (1993) type,
and Andreoni and Payne (2003) use quality. We follow Rose-Ackerman (1982).
9As we refer to it, a social optimum in a charity market is achieved when the total amount of charitable contributions
received by all charities that operate within the market is maximized after the costs associated with fundraising are
incurred.
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We argue that a policy maker can implement a regulatory mechanism in order to achieve the so-
cially desirable amount of fundraising and the number of charities. Basically, this mechanism can
be summarized in two steps. In the rst step, policy maker regulates entry into the charity market.
In the second step, given the initial cost of fundraising, he either imposes a tax that increases the
cost of fundraising up to the optimal level and redistributes the tax revenue among the charities or
subsidizes charities and decreases the cost of fundraising. However, this subsidy is nanced initially
from charities, possibly in the form of entry fees to the market. This mechanism guarantees that the
optimal number of charities operate in the market and the overall net funds raised by all charities are
maximized.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and discusses the equi-
librium properties. Section three introduces a utilitarian social welfare function and obtains the
optimum number and ideological distribution of charities. Section four introduces the policy maker
and presents a regulatory policy that always results in an e¢ cient outcome. Section ve discusses the
main implications of the model and proposes some extensions. Section six concludes.
2 The model
Suppose that there are a nite number of charities in the market with di¤erent ideologies. As we
refer to it, ideologies are qualitative di¤erences among charities that operate within the same category
of charitable activity.10 For instance, within a category of charities that o¤er fellowships for college
education, one charity may give priority to students majoring in social sciences while another may
o¤er nancial assistance for those who are majoring in engineering. Following Economides and Rose-
Ackerman (1993), we treat the ideology of a charity as a point on a circumference of length one. The
objective of each charity is to maximize services that it provides to public. Since private contributions
are the only source of nance, charities strategically target potential donors to solicit donations.
Let I denote the ideology space and Y = fyi 2 I j i 2 Ng be the ideology set of charities that
operate within a representative charitable category where N = f1; :::; ng is the set of charities. Hence,
every charity i has a unique ideology location along the circumference as plotted in Figure 1, panel A,
which is denoted as yi.11 There are also donors in the society, whose ideologies are continuously and
10We refer to di¤erent categories in which individuals contribute to charitable causes. Although there are several
charitable categories, the standard practice is to classify the charitable activity into broad categories. For example,
recent data on charitable activity in the United States (PSID, 2005) obtain information on several broad categories such
as giving to religious organizations, education, health, and environment.
11The ideology space can also be transformed into a unit interval as in Figure 1, panel B. This transformation proved
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uniformly distributed along the circle, through which they are ordered accordingly.12 For example,
a donor, who may contribute to a charitable category, has also an ideology point, say x 2 I. Hence,
donors also di¤er in the charitable services to which they would like to contribute. Continuing with
our previous example, while a donor may contribute more to a charity that o¤ers fellowships to social
science majors, another may give more to a charity that o¤ers fellowships to engineering majors.
2.1 Donors
Every donor is endowed with a xed amount of dollars g > 0 to donate.13 Since each donor donates
a xed amount no matter what others do, the main motivation for giving is warm-glow. People
contribute to charities because they are sympathetic to the causes supported by their favorite charity.14
Following Andreoni and Payne (2003), we assume that people do not give unless they are solicited
by a charity. Charitable solicitations are imperfect signals that inform the potential donor that a
particular charity exists and on the areas the charity focuses on. The signals are imperfect in a sense
that they can only roughly inform the donor on how close her ideology is to that of the charity. Hence,
there are errors associated with the donorsperceptions of the ideologies of the charities that solicited
them. In particular, we assume that errors associated with signals are such that for any given donor
x and any given set of charities Y (x)  Y that have solicited x, the donor believes that charity i is
ideologically closest to her with a probability pi. We dene pi as
pi(yi; x;Y (x))
8>>>><>>>>:
1, if yi = x
1=`(x;yi)P
yj2Y (x)[1=`(x;yj)]
, if yi 2 Y (x) and x =2 Y (x)
0, if yi =2 Y (x) or fyi; xg  Y (x) and yi 6= x
(1)
where `(x; y) is the minimum of the clockwise and counterclockwise distances along the unit circle from
to be useful for illustrative purposes. We provide a formal denition in Appendix B.
12Here, for expositional convenience, we assume that ideologies of individuals are uniformly distributed. However, the
implications of the model can be altered accordingly under di¤erent distributions of ideologies.
13 It is also possible to assume heteregenous donation levels across donors. However, such an assumption further
complicates the model without altering its main implications.
14An example for pure warm-glow giving would be donations to emergency response organizations such Red Cross. In
response to the recent earthquake disaster in Haiti, many people donated small amounts to Red Cross without taking
into consideration of what other people would donate or how much the government would give to the earthquake victims.
In this example, the cause that people are giving to is not a pure public good in a sense that not all people but only the
recipients (earthquake victims) will benet from it. Hence, the main motivation for giving to the earthquake victims
was warm-glow. By generalizing this example, we believe that warm-glow is the dominant driver of donations to those
campaigns that require enormous amount of funding and for which total donations are certain to be only a fraction of
the ideal amount that has to be collected.
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point x to y for all x,y 2 I.15 The charitiesreal ideological views are correctly revealed to donors only
after donations have been made, and the charities make use of these donations to produce charitable
services.
A representative donors preferences are represented by:
U(x) =
8<: 12  min `(x; y) if donation made to some charity y0 otherwise (2)
An implication of the donors preferences is that she receives a higher satisfaction from making a
donation to the charity that is ideologically closest to her. However, since she does not know which
charity is ideologically closest to her at the time of the solicitation, she makes a donation of g dollars
to the charity that she believes to be the closest to her to maximize her expected utility. Given this
assumption, charity is expected return from soliciting a donor is simply gpi(yi; x;Y (x)).
Notice that pi is decreasing among solicitors according to their ideological distance from donor
x and that whenever a charitys and donors ideologies are identical, the donor makes a donation to
that particular charity with certainty. Another implication of equation (2) is that U(x)  0 when
jY (x)j  1. Hence, a solicitation yields positive utility for a donor.
2.2 Charities
In our model, charities produce services and provide them to the public. Production of services is
funded through charitable contributions. Assume that there exists a continuum of charities with
di¤erent ideologies that want to operate in a given charitable category. The fundraising decision and
the resulting payo¤s of charities can be summarized as a two stage game. In the rst stage, charities
simultaneously decide whether to enter the market or not. If a charity does not enter the market,
then it receives a zero payo¤ and does not proceed to the second stage. However, if a charity enters
the market, then it incurs a xed cost, proceeds to the second stage and plays the solicitation game.
At the end of the second stage, it uses contributions to produce charitable services.
2.2.1 The solicitation game
In the second stage, given the ideology distribution of other charities in the market, each charity
simultaneously decides to solicit donations or not. Assume that a nite set of charities N have
15 In equation (1), we assume that jY (x)j > 1, otherwise pi= 1, whenever a single charity solicits the donor. The
rule presented here is a special case of the general rule. We discuss the signal generating process and general rule in
Appendix A.
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entered the market in the rst stage.16 The solicitation game can be described by the following list:
G = (N; (i; i)i2N ) where i is the associated payo¤ as described below and i = ffijfi : I !
fs; dgg.17 Here, fi(x) = s denotes that donor x has been solicited by charity i, whereas fi(x) = d
denotes the opposite.
In analyzing the equilibrium of this game, we adopt a pure strategy SPNE as our equilibrium
concept. Notice that in any SPNE, i  0 is satised for all charities that have entered the market.
Otherwise, there exists a charity j such that j < 0: This implies that charity j did not play its best
response in the rst stage which contradicts the assumption that we have a SPNE.
2.2.2 The payo¤s
We assume that fundraising is costly and that each charity has to pay a xed marginal cost of c 2 (0; g)
for each individual that it has solicited. Then, the marginal expected net donation received by charity
i from donor x is given by
i(yi; x;Y (x)) =
8<: gpi(yi; x;Y (x))  c if yi 2 Y (x)0 otherwise . (3)
Suppose also that there is a xed cost F 2 (0; g  c) that is associated with establishing a charity and
starting a fundraising campaign. Examples of such a cost may include the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) costs that have to be paid by all charities to gain a tax exempt status and the standard cost of
capital. Therefore, at the end of the second stage, net funds available to charity i to provide services
are given as
i =
Z
I
i(yi; x;Y (x))dx  F = i   F . (4)
2.2.3 Production of charitable services
The only input to charities for the production of their services is the net funds i. We further
assume that charities posses a constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology. Hence charity
is production is given by i for all i 2 N . An implication of this production technology is that
total production is a function only of total net funds, which is only a function of total net donations
16The existence of xed costs guarantees that a nite number of charities enter the game in a Sub-game Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE).
17A strategy of a charity is a function that maps every point on the circle to the set fs; dg. Notice that this is the
pure strategy of the charity. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to these strategies only.
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P
i2N i(yi; x; Y (x)) given the number of charities. Therefore total production is dened as:
 =
X
i2N
i =
X
i2N
i   nF: (5)
We assume that each charity maximizes its production of services.18 A su¢ cient but not necessary
condition to maximize production is to maximize marginal net donations from every individual. By
altering its strategy for a single individual, a charity can neither decrease nor increase its payo¤.
Hence, if we allow each charity to choose its strategy without maximizing marginal net donations at
an individual level at every point on the ideology space, a charity would have innitely many strategies
that would result in the same payo¤. In order to address this problem, we impose a restriction on
the equilibrium strategy proles. First, we describe a set of games played at each point on the unit
circle. Let fi(x) = fs; dg be the strategy set of charity i where s is the strategy of the charity to
solicit donor x and d not to. Hence, the solicitation game consists of an innite number of games
played at each point on the ideology space I, and given x, each game is denoted by Gx. Formally,
we describe a game at each point by the following list: Gx = fN; (fi(x); i(yi; x;Y (x))i2Ng, where
i(yi; x; Y (x)) :
Q
j2N fj(x)! [ c; g c]. Using this notation, we formalize the following requirement
for the equilibrium strategies.
Requirement 1 (R1)  satises R1 if  2 fj = ff1 ; f2 :::; fng and (x) = ff1 (x); ::; fn(x)g,
is an equilibrium of the game Gx for all xg.19
Notice that R1 relies on having pure strategy equilibria for all Gx such that x 2 I. The following
proposition shows that such equilibria actually exist and hence, there always exists a strategy prole
 that satises R1.
Proposition 1 Regardless of the level of c, there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE)
of the game Gx for all x 2 I.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that charities maximize marginal net donations from every
single donor and that every equilibrium satises R1. This assumption simplies the interactions
among charities and makes the model easily tractable without a¤ecting its main implications.
18We assume charities are net revenue maximizers. There is conicting evidence however on whether this assumption
holds. For example, Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995) nd that the charities in the health and overseas sectors
maximize net revenue, whereas charities in the social welfare sector do not.
19Note that it trivially follows that  is an equilibrium strategy prole, whenever it satises R1.
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2.3 Equilibrium properties
A socially desirable outcome of the solicitation game should maximize total services that are provided
to public. In order to maximize total charitable services, a necessary condition is to maximize total net
donations received by all charities. When some donors are solicited by multiple charities, this result
may not be obtained due to intense competition for donations. This leads to excessive fundraising
costs. However, if almost every donor is solicited exactly once, then excessive fundraising costs are
eliminated and exactly c dollars have to be spent in order to collect g dollars from a single donor.
Since donorsutilities increase when they are solicited and donate, another important question is
whether every donor has been solicited in the solicitation game. The following proposition summarizes
the result associated with this question.
Proposition 2 Regardless of the level of solicitation costs, every donor is solicited in the NE of the
solicitation game.
Next, we investigate the equilibrium properties and discuss the conditions that guarantee the
maximization of total net donations. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 Assume jY (x)j > 1. (i)The NE of the solicitation game maximizes total net dona-
tions i¤ c  g=2. (ii)There are excessive fundraising costs, if c < g=2.
The next section provides a simple example in order to explain the dynamics of the solicitation
game.
2.4 Example with two charities
Suppose that there are only two charities in the market with ideology locations y1 and y2 as in Figure
1, panel A. Assume that these two charities solicit donations from a donor whose ideology is located
at point x. We plot the returns from soliciting donor x in Figure 2, given that the donor is solicited
by both charities. Notice that in constructing Figure 2, we use the transformed ideology space in
Figure 1, panel B. It is clear that if the ideology of the donor and the charity is the same, then the
donor contributes to that particular charity with certainty. For instance, the donor located at point
0 in Figure 2 gives to the rst charity with certainty. Similarly, the donor located at T (y2) donates
to the second charity, which implies p2 = 1.
In Figure 2, we analyze the solicitation game for two particular cases. First, assume that the cost
of fundraising is lower than g=2 such that c = cl. In equilibrium, donors whose ideology points are
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located in [0; a1) or (a4; 1) intervals are only solicited by the rst charity since in these intervals, the
cost of solicitation is higher than the expected return for the second charity. Similarly, donors whose
ideology points are located in interval (a2; a3) are solicited only by the second charity. Donors whose
ideologies are located in either (a1; a2) or (a3; a4) intervals are solicited by both charities which causes
excessive fundraising in the market. Therefore, as long as c < g=2, there exists excessive fundraising
costs.
Next, assume that the cost of fundraising is relatively high such that c = ch. In the equilibrium,
similar to the above analysis, donors whose ideology points are located in [0; a1) or (a4; 1) intervals
are solicited by the rst charity and donors whose ideologies are in (a2; a3) are solicited by the
second charity. If both charities solicit donations from (a1; a2) or (a3; a4) intervals, then the cost of
fundraising exceeds the expected contribution amount for both charities. Therefore, for these intervals,
any allocation of donors among the two charities is possible as long as each donor is solicited by only
one charity. Hence, if c  g=2, the NE of the solicitation game maximizes total net donations.
It follows from proposition 3 that whenever c  g=2, total net donations are maximized. This
result is also illustrated by this example. However, the number of charities that enter the market in
the rst stage has an adverse e¤ect on the aggregate production of charities. Furthermore, the number
and location of charities also a¤ect donorsutilities. In the next section, we derive a utilitarian social
welfare function and investigate whether unregulated charitable markets produce socially desirable
outcomes.
3 Social Welfare
We have shown that depending on the cost structure, total net donations may not be maximized
without market intervention. This result together with the production structure, implies that total
services provided may not be maximized. In this section, we introduce a utilitarian social welfare
function and show that a similar result holds regarding the maximization of social welfare. That is,
given the cost structure, the equilibrium reached by the solicitation game may be sub-optimal.
As mentioned before, there are two types of agents, namely donors and charities. We assume that
charities do not posses utility functions, but rather they a¤ect the social welfare through their net
production, which is distributed in someway back to society.20 Hence, we dene the social welfare
function as the sum of donorsutilities and total productions by charities. Formally, the utilitarian
20Since we assume that society consists of individuals with linear utility functions, how total net production is
distributed is irrelevant.
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social welfare function can be expressed as:21
W =
Z
I
U(x)dx+ (6)
We assume that the production function of charities is linear. Hence, social welfare as dened in
equation (6) is a function of the number, location, and action of charities.
3.1 Social planners problem
Given any number and ideological distribution of charities, a social planner may organize the market
in a way such that every donor is solicited exactly once by that charity which is ideologically closest
to her.22 In this case, donorsutilities and total production of charitable services are maximized.
Subject to such regulation social welfare can be expressed as
W =
Z
I
(
1
2
 min
i2N
f`(x; yi)g)dx+ (g   c)  nF . (7)
The social planners problem in equation (7) now becomes that of choosing the number and ideological
locations of charities. However, in this maximization problem, the choice set for ideological locations
can only be dened after the number of charities is chosen. In order to simplify this problem, we
dene a value function V for social welfare that yields the highest attainable level of social welfare as
a function of n:
V (n) = max
y1;:::;yn
Z
I
(
1
2
 min
i2N
f`(x; yi)g)dx+ (g   c)  nF . (8)
Notice that the second term of the value function depends on the ideological locations of charities.
Hence, we must rst nd the ideology locations that maximize this term. Given the number of
charities, the following lemma provides the optimal ideology choice of charities.
Lemma 1 Given any number of charities n > 1,
R
I(
1
2   mini2N f`(yi; x)g)dx is maximized when the
ideological distance between any two consecutive charities is the same, which yields V (n) = ( 12   14n).
Hence, we can rewrite equation (8) as
V (n) = (
1
2
  1
4n
) + (g   c)  nF . (9)
21This denition implicitly assumes a positive number of charities. Otherwise, social welfare equals to zero.
22This claim is veried in the next section. To guarantee this result, a social planner may regulate the market through
subsidies or taxes, such that the per unit cost of solicitating a donor is g=2 for a charity. See also Lemma 2 (ii) in
Appendix C.
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Maximizing this function with respect to n, such that n 2 Z+, yields the optimal number of charities.
The set of the welfare maximizing number of charities n is given by
n =
8<: f1g if
1
2
p
F
 1
nm if 1
2
p
F
> 1
(10)
where nm is basically 1
2
p
F
rounded up or down to an integer, or both, depending on which of these
two integers yields a higher social welfare level when inserted into V (n). We summarize our results
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) In order to maximize social welfare, every donor has to be solicited exactly once
by n charities that are exactly 1n apart from the adjacent charity in the ideology space. (ii) If the
marginal cost of diversity F is su¢ ciently low than the optimal structure of the market is not a
monopoly.
If the optimal market structure that maximizes social welfare is a monopoly, then the relevant
policy is straight forward and social optimum can be achieved through market regulation and imposing
barriers to entry. Here, we focus on a more interesting case in which the optimal market structure is
not a monopoly and for the remainder of our analysis, we assume that F is such that n  2.
3.2 Ine¢ ciencies in unregulated charity markets
The following proposition presents our results regarding market e¢ ciency.
Proposition 5 (i) If c < g=2, then all SPNE are ine¢ cient. (ii) If c > g=2, then only a subset of
SPNE are e¢ cient.
This proposition implies that in an unregulated charity market, when costs of solicitation are
unfavorably low, all equilibria necessarily lead to ine¢ cient results. Moreover, even if there are no
problems associated with the cost structures, only a very small subset of SPNE leads to e¢ cient
results.
4 Policy maker
We have shown that in a competitive market, total net donations raised by charities are maximized if
c  g=2. We now investigate whether a policy maker can achieve an equilibrium that maximizes total
12
net donations while inducing the optimal number and ideology locations of charities in the market. In
our model, a natural policy to maximize the total net donations is to regulate the market structure.
In the extreme case, suppose that entry is heavily regulated such that only one monopoly united
charity is allowed to operate in the market. Furthermore, assume that charities that want to operate
in the market are not permitted to solicit donors independently and hence must join the united
charity. Obviously, the monopoly united charity economizes on fundraising costs and maximizes total
net donations since regardless of the cost of fundraising, each donor is solicited only once. Although
this policy seems to be e¤ective, it may also be far from ideal since it eliminates the ideological
diversity in the charity market.23 In reality, not only the volume of services but also the variety
of services is important since people enjoy the existence of charities which are ideologically close to
them. Therefore, the trade-o¤ between diversity and volume of services provided is an important
policy dilemma.
A possible solution to this dilemma is to organize the monopoly united charity in such a way
that donorscontributions to specic purposes is honored. Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) show that
this can be achieved by a pre-commitment device. Such a device is generally not used however, and
the existence of only one charity is hardly ever justiable.24 We argue that a carefully designed
mechanism implemented by a policy maker can maximize total net donations without sacricing the
variety of services. As we dene him, a policy maker has limited regulatory power and nancial
resources to enforce his policies. In particular, he uses tax and subsidy to regulate the market. He
neither has nancial resources besides those generated from charities nor a right to keep the revenues
raised by taxing charities. Hence, whenever he wishes to impose a subsidy, he has to nance it
from charities, and whenever he wishes to tax charities, he has to redistribute the revenues back to
charities. Furthermore, he collects a xed entry or registration fee from each charitable organization
that would like to operate in the market. Therefore, he has a right to award operating licences or
impede unlicensed charities from operating.25
In reality, there are several regulatory bodies that can impose restrictions on charities. The power
of the policy maker and the nature of regulations widely di¤er in each state. For example, some states
require a maximum fundraising expenditure based on the donations received, while some others do
23Fisher (1977) also discusses that donors may be worse o¤ with a united monopoly charity because they are being
forced to make a tied purchase.
24Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) argue that individual chapters of national organizations are an exception.
25 In reality, policy makers may have outside nancial resources. However, the mechanism that we propose can easily
be modied to incorporate this possibility.
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not. However, the above assumptions are generally in line with the current practices in the U.S. For
example, the most common requirement in the U.S. is to impose a registration fee on new charities
that would like to operate in the market. Currently, forty ve states require registration fees to
award operating licenses. As a natural consequence of this regulation, the policy maker has a right
to prevent unregistered or unlicensed charities from operating in the market.
In a regulated market, a charity has to pay a registration fee in order to operate in the market
but its xed cost is paid by the policy maker. Let Ei denote the entry fee for charity i. Equation (4)
transforms to ei = i   Ei. (11)
As we mentioned before, Ei is the policy makers only source to pay all xed costs of entrants and to
nance subsidies. No outside nancial sources imply that
X
i2N
Ei = nF + (c  co)  (12)
where co denotes the subsidized or taxed cost of solicitation and   is the measure of solicitations that
have been made.
Given equation (12), our purpose is to develop a mechanism that maximizes total net donations
and allows the optimal number of charities with the optimal ideological distribution to operate in the
market. We proceed by illustrating a negative result, which will motivate our next assumption.
Proposition 6 There does not exist a mechanism that can be designed by the policy maker that would
induce n > n charities to operate in the market, where n = (g   c)=F .
As mentioned before, the policy maker has limited nancial power to enforce his policies. There-
fore, we rule out cases for which the optimal number of charities is so high that without any outside
funding, it is impossible to support an equilibrium in which the optimal number of charities coexist.
Proposition 6 introduces a critical number above which it is no longer possible to support equilibria
without additional funding.
Formally, we assume that F is such that n > n for all n 2 n(F ). This is a simplifying assumption
which allows us to ignore feasibility constraints. Alternatively, it can be thought of as a condition
dening the charitable activities that we focus on. We are only interested in charitable activities that
do not require any outside funding. Notice also that together with our previous assumption, we have
the following constraint on the optimal number of charities: n > n > 1 for all n 2 n.
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An obvious implication of proposition 6 is that a SPNE, in which there exists a number of charities
for which the total xed costs exceed the maximum possible net donations, cannot be reached by a
mechanism designed by a policy maker without any outside funding. This observation also implies
that if the optimal number of charities is too high, it is necessary to nance the charity market via
sources other than those come from the charities themselves. In the next sub-section, we continue by
proposing a mechanism that yields a SPNE.
4.1 The mechanism ()
In order to maximize total net donations, the policy maker can implement the following mechanism
in which n < n charities coexist.
Stage 1: The policy maker randomly draws an ideology point y1 from the ideology space.
Stage 2: It selects n charities on the ideology space (y1 being one of them) such that each
charity is 1=n apart from the next charity on the ideology space.
Stage 3: These charities are o¤ered two options:
(i) Pay E = F + (c g=2)nm up-front to the policy maker and solicit donors at the cost of g=2, or do
not enter the charity market, if c > g=2 (subsidy).
(ii) Pay F up-front to the policy maker and and solicit donors at the cost of g=2, or do not enter
the charity market, if c < g=2 (tax).
Stage 4: The policy maker collects the Es (or Fs if c < c0) from the charities that enter the
market and pays the xed costs for all charities.
Stage 5: Charities begin operating and soliciting donors. Whenever a donor is solicited, the
charity pays g=2 and the policy maker either pays the rest of the cost if c > g=2 or collects the
di¤erence g=2  c if c < g=2.
Stage 6: If c < g=2 (tax), the policy maker pays each charity an additional (g=2 c)nm . Otherwise,
this stage does not exist.
Stage 7: Charities produce services with the monetary sources they have.
Proposition 7 Every SPNE obtained by  is e¢ cient and satises the no-outside funding constraint.
The powerful result of this mechanism is that not only it induces the optimal outcome, but also
the equilibria induced by this mechanism are always optimal. In other words, it alleviates market
ine¢ ciencies that are due to cost structures and coordination problems. Although this mechanism
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requires n > n, this is only a feasibility requirement. With outside funding opportunities, a similar
mechanism can also be designed.
5 Discussion of results
Throughout the paper, we assumed that donors are endowed with a xed amount, g, to donate. This
assumption is inconsistent with the expectation that a donors marginal utility from donation would
be decreasing in the total amount collected by charities. Accordingly, the more donors expect charities
to collect, the less would they be willing to give to them. This aspect of charitable contributions is
widely discussed in the literature and would be important in determining the e¤ects of government
contributions to charities, tax reductions o¤ered to charities, and other administrative issues related
to the way charitable contributions are collected. However, this inconsistency is unlikely to alter
our main results and their implications. This conjecture is likely to follow from the fact that the
conclusions reached in this paper are related to distributive aspects in charity markets rather than
the magnitude of aggregate donations.
In our model, optimality requires that a number of equidistant charities solicit only those donors
to whom they are the closest charity. This result is likely to follow in a model incorporating crowding-
out, because crowding-out relates only to the amount of charitable contributions made by each donor.
A donors contribution will not be a¤ected by the number of solicitations received by him, as long as
this number does not a¤ect his expectation concerning the amount of donations that will be collected
by his favorite charity. Accordingly, it will be still optimal for each donor to be solicited by a single
charity. This will be achieved by having equidistant charities that solicit only those donors to whom
they are the closest charity. Hence, crowding-out is not likely to a¤ect our rst main result.
The next main insight provided in this paper is that the optimal number of charities does not
need to be one. This follows from our assumption that donors care about the ideology of the charity
that they give to. A variant of this assumption which incorporates crowding-out would be that
donors care about charitiesideologies and the amount of total donations they expect them to collect.
Furthermore, a reasonable version of this assumption would have the following characteristic: A donor
would be a happier person in a world where two charities (one of which is ideologically closer to him)
each collect $1 million than in a world where a single charity that is ideologically far away from him
collects $2 million. Given this reasonable alternative assumption, our result concerning the potential
non-desirability of a monopoly is likely to hold.
16
To verify our conjecture, consider a world where there is a single charity. Allowing a second
charity (that is 0:5 away from the initial charity) to enter the market and regulating it such that
both charities solicit only those donors to whom they are the closest charity will increase the total
amount of charitable contributions received. This follows because each donor who is closer to the
ex-monopoly will increase her contribution, knowing that the monopolys total collection will drop
when a second charity enters the market. Given the fact that the ex-monopoly will collect donations
from half of the donors, donations collected by it will exceed half of what it used to collect as a
monopoly. Since the entrant charity will be in a symmetric situation, its collected donations will also
exceed half of what was collected in a monopoly structure. Hence, total charitable contributions will
increase, which will presumably lead to an increase in welfare (through ). Donors who are closer
to the entrant charity will also be happier because they make contributions to the charity that is
ideologically closer to them. The only people who may be less happy are the ones who are closer to
the ex-monopoly charity because donations collected by this charity are presumably less than what
they once were. But this drop in the ex-monopolys donorsutilities will be o¤-set by the increase in
the entrants donorsutilities, because a drop in the ex-monopolys revenue also implies an increase
in the marginal utility obtained by its donors (an implication of crowding-out). Hence, moving to
a duopoly increases welfare through  and donorsaggregate utilities, while lowering it through an
increase in xed costs (F ). Therefore, our main proposition that a monopoly is undesirable if F is
su¢ ciently low remains valid, even under a reasonable crowding-out assumption.
Since crowding-out is not directly incorporated in the model, it seems at rst sight that our model
is similar to traditional models of product di¤erentiation. However, due to the absence of explicit
pricing in charity markets, the model presented in this paper is not similar to comparable models
for di¤erentiated goods. In this paper, we considered a two stage game played by charities. In the
rst period, charities decide whether to enter the charitable market. In the second stage, those who
have entered solicit donations from donors. The analog of this game for di¤erentiated goods would
have three stages, or two stages with a second stage where rms strategies comprise of choosing
the consumers to send advertisements and choosing prices for their goods. As such, the analysis of
such a game would be more sophisticated, and depending on the modelling choice it may not have a
solution.26
Furthermore, compared with the traditional models of product di¤erentiation, our analysis is
26See, for instance, dAspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) showing in the standard Hotelling (1929) framework
that "no equilibrium price solution will exist when both sellers are not far enough from each other". Similar problems
are likely to be encountered with the inclusion of price in our model.
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conducted at a higher level of generality. Appendix A lists four simple and intuitive properties
that donorsbehavior must satisfy for our analysis to remain valid. To incorporate pricing by rms
in combination with consumers tastes for product varieties, the level of generality in our model
must be reduced. This follows from the fact that a consumers likelihood of buying an advertised
good will depend not only on how close the product is to that consumers taste, but also on its
price. Accordingly, a trade-o¤ between price and taste must be specied for the consumer. This
will necessarily require an alteration of the generalized properties listed in Appendix A, which will
lead to a reduction in generality. This is another reason as to why our model is more appropriate
for analyzing charitable giving rather than interactions between consumers and rms in a market for
advertised and di¤erentiated goods.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target pop-
ulation to solicit donations. Using a utilitarian social welfare function, we rst show that everything
else equal, diversity is a desirable aspect in charity markets. However, there are xed costs associated
with establishing charities, which can be viewed as the marginal cost of diversity. Hence, there is a
trade-o¤ associated with the total production of charities and diversity.
Next, we show that in a competitive charity market with no entry barriers and outside intervention,
the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities may be sub-
optimal. We analyze whether a social planner with limited regulatory powers can overcome these
ine¢ ciencies and show that a mechanism which regulates the entry in the market and imposes either
a tax or subsidy on fundraising costs can be designed to achieve optimal outcomes. Therefore, direct
market structure regulation seems to be an e¤ective way of solving the trade-o¤ between the variety
and volume of charitable services. Furthermore, such a policy may be employed even if policy maker
has very limited nancial resources and few regulatory tools.
In contrast to the conventional wisdom that a monopoly charity is socially desirable, our model
does not necessarily imply monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if xed costs
associated with establishing charities are su¢ ciently low, then the optimal market structure is not
a monopoly. Besides its policy implications, this result is particularly important primarily for two
reasons. First, joining a united monopoly charity is generally undesirable for ideologically disparate
charities. Second, monopoly charities are rarely observed and the diversity of ideologies is almost
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always honored in existing charity markets.
We do not, however, advocate the adoption of our regulatory mechanism as it is presented in
section 4. The proposed mechanism seeks to identify a method to achieve e¢ ciency absent any con-
straint (e.g. political, technological or constitutional). In reality, however, there are many constraints.
A technological constraint would be the determination of any charitys true ideological location. A
constitutional one would be the Bill of Rights. While determining policies, legislators must take these
constraints into consideration. The use of our mechanism, then, is to allow legislators to come up
with policies which approximate the solution proposed by our mechanism while taking realistic con-
siderations into account. Such policies may include the use of subsidies to encourage charities with
under-performing ideologies (as is done in many a¢ rmative action programs) in combination with an
increase in the xed costs of establishing charities. Such a policy would likely have e¤ects similar to
the proposed mechanism without violating the Bill of Rights.
A Generalized signaling process
Suppose that charity i with the ideological position yi produces a signal si. If the donor and the
charity share the same location, this signal produces perfect information, i.e. the donor is certain
that charity i and she share the same ideological location. Otherwise, let hi(si) be the density function
which denes the donors likelihood of receiving si from charity i. We assume that hi satises the
following properties:
(i) hi(a) = h(`(a; yi))  hi(b) = h(`(b; yi)) i¤ `(a; yi)  `(b; yi) for all i.
(ii) hi(x) > 0 for all x 2 I.
(iii)
R
x2I hi(x)dx = 1.
Our model assumes that donors believe that charity i is ideologically closest to them with a
probability pi which satises a unique rule given in equation (1). This rule is used for expositional
convenience and is not necessary to derive any of the results which follow. The signal generating
process outlined above leads donors to donate to the charity from which they receive the closest
signal. This in turn leads a charity to have a probability pi of receiving donations from donor x, which
follows the general properties outlined below. These properties are the only necessary properties to
achieve the results presented in this paper and dened as follows:
If jY (x)j = 1, then pi(yi; x;Y (x)) = 1, for yi 2 Y (x). If jY (x)j > 1, the donor makes a donation
of g to charity i with yi 2 Y (x) with a probability pi according to a rule that satises the following
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properties:
(i) 8i with yi 2 Y (x), pi(yi; x;Y (x))  0 and
P
i pi(yi; x;Y (x)) = 1.
(ii) pi(yi; x;Y (x)) = 1 () `(x; yi) = 0.
(iii) Let Y (x) = fy1; y2; ::::; yi; :::; yng and Y (x)\ya = ; = Y (x)\yb. If yi 6= x, then pa(ya; x; fY [
yag)  pb(yb; x; fY [ ybg) () `(x; ya)  `(x; yb).
(iv) If 9 2 Y (x) such that  = x, then 8i; j with yi,yj 2 Y (x)=fg, pi(yi; x;Y (x)) = pj(yj ; x;Y (x)) =
0. Otherwise, 8i; j with yi,yj 2 Y (x), pi(yi; x;Y (x))  pj(yj ; x;Y (x)) () `(x; yi)  `(x; yj).
The proofs in Appendix C rely only on these properties.
B Denitions
This appendix presents formal denitions for some of the concepts that are discussed in the text. We
also provide some additional denitions that will be useful in proving some of the propositions and
lemmas.
Denition 1 Reference point r.
Let d(x; y) be the clockwise distance from x to y. Hence, d(x; y)  12 () d(x; y) = `(x; y).
(i) For jN j  2 and when there does not exist i; j 2 N such that `(yi; yj) = 12 , pick any two
consecutive charities ya,yb on the ideology space. Than pick r 2 I to be that point that satises
`(ya; r) = `(yb; r) =
`(ya;yb)
2 .
(ii) If there exists i; j 2 N such that `(yi; yj) = 12 , due to the uniqueness of ideology points, it
must be true that jN j = 2. In this case pick one of the charities and call it y1. Implicitly dene r 2 I
as that point that satises d(y1; r) = 14 .
Denition 2 Indices of charities.
(i) For jN j  2 and when there does not exist i; j 2 N such that `(yi; yj) = 12 , given the reference
point r, index charities (including ya and yb) according to their clockwise distance from r such that
d(r; yi+1) > d(r; yi) for all i 2 N=fng. Since ideology locations of charities are unique, this ordering
is well dened. Note also that, according to the new indexing, fya; ybg = fy1; yng.
(ii) If there exists i; j 2 N such that `(yi; yj) = 12 , due to the uniqueness of ideology points, it
must be true that jN j = 2. In this case, pick an arbitrary charity and call it 1 and call the other 2.
Denition 3 Equal distance points f1; :::; ng:
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(i) For jN j  2 and when there doesnt exist i; j 2 N such that `(yi; yj) = 12 , implicitly dene
i 2 I to be that point which satises `(yi; i) = `(yi+1; i) = `(yi;yi+1)2 for all i 2 N=fng, and n = r.
Note that `(y1; n) = `(yn; n) =
`(y1;yn)
2 .
(ii) If There exists i; j 2 N such that `(yi; yj) = 12 , due to the uniqueness of ideology points, it
must be true that jN j = 2. In this case let 1 = r and implicitly dene 2 as that point that satises
d(y2; 2) =
1
4 .
Denition 4 Transformed ideology space.
Given r dene T (:) : I ! [0; 1) as T (y) = d(r; y). T (y) is the transformed ideology location of y
given the reference point r; which lies on the unit interval. This transformation implies the following:
For all i 2 N=fng and for all x such that T (x) 2 [T (yi); T (i)], it must be true that `(x; yi) =
T (x)  T (yi). For all i 2 N=fng and for all x such that T (x) 2 [T (i); T (yi+1)], it must be true that
`(x; yi+1) = T (yi+1)   T (x). For all x such that T (x) 2 [T (yn); 1), it must be true that `(x; yn) =
T (x)  T (yn). For all x such that T (x) 2 [0; T (y1)], it must be true that `(x; 0) = T (y1)  T (x).
C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 By using the transformation T (:), we haveR
I(
1
2 mini2N f`(yi; x)g)dx = [
1
2 
R T (y1)
0 (T (x) 0)dT (x)+2
Pn 1
i=1
R T (yi)+T (yi+1)
2
T (yi)
(T (x) T (yi))dT (x)+R 1
T (yn)
(T (x)  T (yn))dT (x)].
Integrating, we haveR
I(
1
2  mini2Nf`(yi; x)g)dx = [ 12   14
P
`(yi; yi+1)
2]. Hence, maximizing
R
I(
1
2  mini2N f`(yi; x)g)dx
is equivalent to minimizing
P
`(yi; yi+1)
2 by choosing fy1; y2; :::; yng such that
P
`(yi; yi+1) = 1. This
requires `(yi; yi+1) = 1n for all i. This implies that the maximized value of
R
I(
1
2  mini2Nf`(yi; x)g)dx
equals to [ 12   14n ].
Proof of Proposition 1 Let jN j > 1. We re-order the charities according to their distance from x
in the following way: `(yn; x)  `(yn 1; x)  ::::  `(y1; x). Notice that there exists a nite number of
x 2 I, where there are multiple orderings that satisfy this condition. In this case, we can arbitrarily
pick one of these orderings.
For all games Gx where x 2 I, we dene the strategy prole h(x) implicitly as i < h and
i 2 N () fi(x) = s for all h 2 N[fn+1g. Hence, at the strategy prole h(x), Y (x) = f1; 2:::; h 1g.
Given this notation, if for some   n,  l(x) is not an equilibrium for any l  , then it can
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be concluded that at the strategy prole (x), charity  is not playing its best response while all
preceding charities are. To show the validity of this statement, we use proof by induction to generalize.
For  = 1, the claim trivially holds. Assume that the argument is true for    1. We show
that it is also true for . If for some   n, l     1 implies that  l(x) is not an equilibrium, at
the strategy prole  1(x) charity   1 is not playing its best response and all preceding charities
are. Hence, at the strategy prole (x), charity    1 is playing its best response, which implies
for all i     1, charity i is playing its best response since 0   1(ya 1; x; f1; 2::;    1g) 
(yi; x; f1; 2::;    1g) for all i     1. If (x) is not an equilibrium prole, then there exists a
j such that n  j   and j(yj ; x; f1; 2::;    1g) < j(yj ; x; ff1; 2::;    1g [ fjgg). But for any
j  , j(yj ; x; ff1; 2::;    1g [ fjgg)  (ya; x; ff1; 2::;    1g [ fgg). Hence, if for some   n,
l   implies that  l(x) is not an equilibrium, then charity  is not playing its best response at the
strategy prole (x) while all preceding charities are.
Furthermore, if for all   n, (x) is not an equilibrium, then n+1(x) is. For all   n, (x)
is not an equilibrium implies that n(yn; x; f1; 2::; n   1g) = 0 < n(yn; x; ff1; 2::; n   1g [ fngg) =
n(yn; x; f1; 2::; ng). But n(yn; x; f1; 2::; ng)  i(yi; x; f1; 2::; ng) holds for all i 2 N . And when
Y (x) = f1; 2::; ng we are at the strategy prole n+1(x), and as shown none of the charities have a
protable deviation. Therefore, it is an equilibrium prole. Hence, there always exists a pure strategy
NE of the game Gx for all x 2 I.
Proof of Proposition 2 Assume that jN j > 1 and dene S(x) = fi : fi(x) = s and i 2 Ng. A
strategy prole in which jS(x)j = 0 cannot be an equilibrium of the game Gx, since any charity i
can increase its payo¤ to (g   c) by soliciting donations. Proposition 1 implies there exists a pure
strategy equilibrium of all games Gx. Hence, jS(x)j > 0 for all x 2 I, which implies that every donor
is solicited.
Proof of Proposition 3 The following lemma is required for the proof.
Lemma 2 (i)If c  g=2, then almost every donor is solicited exactly once in an equilibrium satisfying
R1. (ii) If c = g=2, then almost every donor is solicited by the charity which is ideologically closest
to him.
Proof. (i) Dene Z0 = fx 2 I : `(yi; x) = `(yj ; x) for some j; i 2 Ng and Z = I=Z0. Note
that almost every donor is in Z . If n > 2, then a strategy prole where jS(x)j  3 cannot be a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game Gx, since
P
i2S gpi(yi; x;Y (x)) = g implies that there exists
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j 2 S such that gpj(yj ; x;Y (x)) < g=2. If n  2, then for all x 2 Z a strategy prole that satises
jS(x)j = 2 is not a NE of the game Gx. In order to see this, let fn;mg = S(x). Since, `(yn; x) 6=
`(ym; x) =) pn(yn; x;Y (x)) 6= pm(ym; x;Y (x)), which implies that there exists h 2 fn;mg such that
gph(yh; x;Y (x)) < g=2. Hence, by Proposition 1 and 2, jS(x)j = 1 for all x 2 Z.
(ii) Dene q(x) = fi : `(yi; x) < `(yj ; x) 8 j 2 N=figg, for all x 2 Z. Then, a strategy prole
that satises jS(x)j = 1 and q(x) =2 S(x) is not a NE of the game Gx, since q(x)(yq(x); x; S(x)) =
0 < q(x)(yq(x); x; fS(x)[ q(x)g) implies that q(x) has a protable deviation:However, for all x 2 Z, a
strategy prole where S1(x) = fq(x)g is a NE. In this strategy prole, q(x) cannot improve upon the
outcome since q(x)(yq(x); x; q(x)) = g > 0. Furthermore, the remaining charities cannot improve upon
the outcome, since for all i 2 N=fqg, i(yi; x; q(x)) = 0 > i(yi:x; fi; q(x)g) = gpi(yi; x;Y (x))   g=2
since gpi(yi; x;Y (x)) < g=2. By denition, q(x) is the closest charity to donor x in the ideology space.
Hence, c = g=2 implies that in any equilibrium of the game G satisfying R1, almost every donor is
solicited only by the charity that is closest to him.
Let jN j > 1.
(i) Lemma 2 implies that almost every donor is solicited exactly once, hence total net donations
are maximized at (g   c).
(ii) Dene i; yi for all i and r, as in Appendix B. Dene the following strategy prole k(x)
for the game Gx: f1(x) = f2(x) = s and fj(x) = d, for all j 2 N=f1; 2g. Then 2(y2; 1; f1; 2g) =
1(y1; 1; f1; 2g) = g=2 c > 0 holds. Since  is continuous in x there exists " > 0 such that, whenever
x 2 X"  f! 2 Ij `(!; 1)  "g;
(1) 1(y1; x; f1; 2g) > 0 and 2(y2; x; f1; 2g) > 0 hold, and
(2) `(yj ; x) > maxf`(y1; x); `(y2; x)g, 8j 2 N=f1; 2g.
Then, for all x 2 X", any strategy prole such that jS(x)j = 1 is not a NE of the game Gx. To see
this and let l be the only charity soliciting donations from x. First, let l 6= 1, then 1(y1; x; l) = 0 <
gp1(y1; x; f1; lg) c. If l = 1, then 2(y2; x; 1) = 0 < gp2(y2; x; f1; 2g) c. Note that the rst inequality
follows from the properties of the generalized distribution rule. X" has a positive measure and x 2 X"
implies that Gx does not have an equilibrium in which a single charity solicits x. By proposition 1,
there exists a pure strategy NE at all x 2 I. Therefore, by proposition 2, x 2 X" implies that Gx has
an equilibrium with jS(x)j  2. Hence, there exists excessive fundraising whenever c < g=2.
Proof of Proposition 4 (i) The only part that does not follow from the analysis in section 3.1 is
as follows:
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Assuming V (n) is continuous in n, the maximizer of this function is
q
1
4F . But V (n) is concave
in this case. Hence, the integers that maximize V (n) are those that are closest to
q
1
4F . This implies
that
n =
8<: f1g if
q
1
4F  1
nm if
q
1
4F > 1
.
Formally, let nl = supfZ+ \ [0;
q
1
4F ]g and nu = inffZ+ \ [
q
1
4F ;1)g. Then, we can express nm
as a correspondence such that nm = argmax
n2fnl;nug
V (n).
(ii) F  14 implies that n  2 for all n 2 n(F ).
Proof of Proposition 5 The following Lemmas are required for the proof.
Lemma 3 For any n, let c  g=2. A strategy prole in which charities solicit donations from almost
all donors to whom they are the closest is a NE of the solicitation game.
Proof. Let q(x) = fi : `(yi; x) < `(yj ; x) 8 j 2 N=figg, for all x 2 Z. Pick any prole satisfying
S(x) = fq(x)g for all x 2 Z. Then for all x 2 Z, q(x)(yq(x); x; q(x)) = (g   c) > q(x)(yq(x); x; ;) = 0,
and i(yi; x; q(x)) = 0 > gpi(yi; x; fq(x); ig)  g2  gpi(yi; x; fq(x); ig)  c for all i 2 N=fq(x)g where
the second strict inequality follows from the properties of the general allocation rule. Therefore, no
charity has a protable deviation from this strategy prole.
Lemma 4 When c  g=2, there always exists a SPNE in which every charity solicits those donors,
for whom they are the closest charity.
Proof. Dene nh  supfZ+\fxjx  n and x 2 Rgg. Consider the prole where only nh charities,
which are 1=nh apart from each other, enter in the rst stage. Furthermore, assume that every charity
has a strategy of soliciting only those donors to whom they are the closest charity, whenever they
enter the game. By Lemma 3, this strategy prole generates a NE in every possible sub-game. In
particular, in a sub-game where only nh charities that are 1=nh apart from each other enter in the
rst stage, this strategy prole constitutes a NE of the solicitation game.
In this strategy prole, nh  n implies that i  0. Hence, the nh charities do not have a protable
deviation in the rst round. Furthermore, given the strategies of every other charity, charities that
have not entered in the rst round, do not have a protable deviation from not entering. Assume
that a new charity enters the market. Given the strategies of the nh charities, its best response is to
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solicit donors that are closest to its ideology, which generates a payo¤ of 1
2nh
(g   c). Therefore, for
entrance to be protable 1
2nh
(g c) > F must hold. But by denition, F = (g c)=n. Hence, we have
n > 2nh. Again by denition, nh + 1 > n. Combining the two inequalities, we must have nh < 1,
which is a contradiction with our assumption that n > n > 1. Hence, there cannot be any protable
deviation for charities that do not enter in this strategy prole. Therefore, this strategy prole is a
SPNE.
(i) Follows immediately from propositions 3 and 4.
(ii) Let nk denote the greatest element of n (if n is singleton, nk is its only element) and assume
nk  3. If nk = 2, the proof can be trivially extended to that case as well. And let nh be the same
number as in Lemma 4. If nk 6= nh, then by Lemma 4, there are other SPNE that are ine¢ cient. If
nk = nh, then there exists " > 0 such that a prole in which nk charities for which `(yi; yi+1) = 1=nk
for all i 2 f2; :::; nkg, `(ynk ; y1) = 1nk   2" and `(y1; y2) = 1nk + 2" is satised enter in the rst stage
and every charitys strategy is to solicit only those donors to whom they are the closest whenever
they enter in the rst stage, is a SPNE.
In order to verify the validity of this claim, rst note that by Lemma 3 this strategy prole
constitutes a NE at any possible sub-game. Next, notice that nk = (
1
nk
  ")(g   c)   F and that
there exists " > 0 such that nk > 0 since n
k < n. Furthermore, nk < i for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; nk   1g.
Hence, none of the charities that have entered in the rst stage have a protable deviation by not
entering. Finally, by a similar argument as in Lemma 4, observe that charities that have not entered
in the rst stage do not have a protable deviation in the rst stage by entering. Since in this strategy
prole all charities are not equidistant from each other, there always exists ine¢ cient SPNE of this
game.
Proof of Proposition 6 Let n denote the smallest element of n. Let  i be the proportion of
donors solicited by charity i, than
P
i2N  i =  , is the measure of solicitations made. Note that each
donor donates g whenever she is solicited, regardless of the number of solicitations that she received.
Therefore,
P
i2N i 
8<:  (g   co) 
P
i2N Ei if   < 1
g    co  
P
i2N Ei if    1
.
Hence,   < 1 implies
P
i2N i   (g   co) 
P
i2N Ei =  (g   co)  nF    (c  co) =  (g   c)  nF < (g   c)  nF .
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Where the rst equality is obtained by imposing the no outside nancial sources constraint.
Therefore, (g c) Fn >Pi2N i has to be satised. However, by assumption (g c)=F = n < n.
Hence, 0 > (g  c) Fn >Pi2N i, a contradiction with the SPNE requirement that i  0 for all i.
   1 implies
P
i2N i  g    co  
P
i2N Ei = g    co   nF    (c  co) = g    c  nF  (g   c)  Fn.
Where the rst equality is obtained by imposing the no outside nancial sources constraint.
Hence, (g   c)   Fn  Pi2N i. This condition together with (g   c)=F = n < n implies that
0 > (g   c)  Fn >Pi2N i. Therefore, in SPNE, n  n has to be satised.
Proof of Proposition 7 The strategy prole where every charity accepts the o¤er in Step 3 and
solicits only those donors, for whom it is the closest charity in any sub-game, is the only type of
SPNE and is e¢ cient. First, observe that by Lemma 2, this strategy prole constitutes the only NE
of the solicitation game. Second, observe that this results in i > 0 for all i. Hence, no charity has a
protable deviation in the rst round and this prole is indeed a SPNE. By Proposition 4, it is also
e¢ cient.
To check that every SPNE is of this form, observe that by Lemma 2, the strategy proles where
charities solicit only those donors, for whom they are the closest charity, is the only NE of the
solicitation game. Hence, in any SPNE, every charity must be playing these strategies at every sub-
game and if there is a di¤erent type of SPNE of this game, it must be the one where only a subset of
the charities to whom an o¤er has been extended to, accept the o¤ers. But, this implies that those not
entering in the rst round have a protable deviation. In every sub-game of the game, each charity
solicits only those donors for whom it is the closest charity. Given this behavior of other charities,
those that have not entered would generate a positive payo¤ from entering and soliciting those donors
to whom they are the closest charity (they would simply reach our e¢ cient SPNE). In such SPNE,
the no-outside borrowing constraint is trivially met.
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Figure 2. Returns to solicitations for two charities 
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